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Abstract 
Driven by the desire to fulfill the Maastricht fiscal criteria and pressed by mounting 
debt burdens that have accumulated over the past 30 years, a majority of EU-15 
countries attempted to reduce their budget deficits during the 1990s. Yet, these 
nations have exhibited remarkable differences in their ability to pursue such 
retrenchment policies.  This paper endeavours to illuminate the political and 
institutional factors that can help explain those differing degrees of fiscal 
retrenchment in European Union countries for the time period 1990-2001. Several 
variants of the partisan approach and the veto players framework are elucidated and 
applied to the question of budgetary consolidation. These elaborations yield four
working hypotheses which are empirically tested using a time-series cross-section 
data set of 14 EU countries. The results lend support to the notion that a low number 
of institutional veto players increases likelihood and extent of a budgetary 
retrenchment. Given these findings it is possible to draw some conclusions 
concerning the effectiveness and deficiencies of the Stability and Growth Pact. 
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This paper has been prepared as a part of a broader Ezoneplus project that 
evaluates European Monetary Union (EMU) and its enlargement to prospective 
members in central and eastern Europe. The project is financially supported by 
European Commission (HPSE-CT-2001-00084).   1 
The progress of the enormous debts which at present oppress, and will in the long-run 
probably ruin, all the great nations of Europe has been pretty uniform. 
       (Adam  Smith,  1776) 
 
1.   Introduction 
Since the economic downturn in 2001, major policy debates in Europe have revolved, once 
again, around the question of fiscal deficits. Several member countries of the European 
Union
1 have been repeatedly in breach of the provisions of the Stability and Growth Pact 
(SGP) which spawned not only domestic but also EU-wide discussions on the pros and 
cons of the pact. The SGP clarifies and enshrines the fiscal convergence criteria originally 
laid out in the Treaty of Maastricht (TEU) in 1992. It mandates that the fiscal deficit of 
every country participating in the European Monetary Union (EMU) shall not exceed 3% 
per year. Repeated breach of this stipulation can result in heavy fines of up to 0.5% of a 
country’s GDP.  
While public debates on the SGP usually focus on countries that are about to exceed the 
deficit ceiling, it has to be pointed out that a great number of EU countries have been 
highly successful in reducing their deficits. For example, Finland and Great Britain suffered 
from budget deficits in excess of 7% of GDP in 1993, and both managed to turn these into 
surpluses by 1998. Other countries such as Germany or Portugal only moderately reduced 
their deficits in the middle of the 1990s and saw them rise again at the end of the decade. 
Hence, even though average deficits in the EU have decreased from over 6% of GDP in 
1993 to almost zero in 2001, there is still a wide variety of outcomes. The existence of the 
SGP alone cannot explain these different developments. Rather, instead of being an 
explanation in itself, the fiscal criteria of the TEU and SGP provide a common external 
constraint
2 on the fiscal policies of member states. In conjunction with the recession that 
hit Europe at the beginning of the 1990s and which led to burgeoning deficits, they 
provided a strong motivation for all governments to attempt fiscal consolidation.  
Therefore, the EU countries in the 1990s and at the beginning of the new millennium 
provide a unique framework for asking which political and institutional factors determine a 
country’s ability to reduce its deficit. This is the overall question that motivates this paper. 
Specifically, since much of the literature shows that economic variables, like real growth or 
the unemployment rate, alone do not suffice to explain divergent deficit outcomes (e.g. 
Alesina and Perotti 1995; Franzese 2002a; De Wolff 1998; Woo 2003), this paper tries to 
illuminate which political and institutional factors may account for the observed 
differences.  
                                                 
1 France, Germany and Portugal, and, as turned out recently, also Greece 
2 Even though Denmark, Sweden and the UK are not members of the Eurozone and, thus, do not have to 
fear the sanctions of the SGP, they still do participate in the annual budgetary review procedure by the 
European Commission (EC) and would face (non-binding) recommendations by the EC if they were in 
breach of the SGP-provisions. Hence I assume similar constraints and motivations for these countries.   2 
Note that the  focus here is exclusively on determinants of deficit reduction
3. In particular, 
two approaches, the partisan theory and the veto-player approach, are discussed.
4 It will be 
shown how these rather general theories can be utilized, so they may hold the promise of 
explaining why some European countries were more able than others to cut their budget 
deficits. These elaborations will yield several hypotheses that are then empirically tested 
using a time-series cross-section data set of 14 EU countries
5 for the time period 1990-
2001. These analyses show that domestic political forces and institutional structures 
continue to play a decisive role in shaping budgetary outcomes. Hence, from this political 
economy perspective the Stability and Growth Pact is bound to fail, for in its current 
shape, it cannot undo nor sufficiently alter these national constraints and incentives. 
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 will provide some basic empirical facts about 
the long-term development of deficits in the EU and offers two definitions of what 
constitutes a successful fiscal retrenchment. Section 3 introduces several versions of the 
partisan theory and applies it to the question of fiscal consolidation. In the 4
th section, the 
veto-player approach is presented. In particular, a spatial and a dynamic variant are 
discussed. Section 5 then proceeds to the empirical testing of the two theories, employing 
time-series cross-section analyses. Section 6 reviews the analysis carried out in this paper, 
sums up the results and draws some conclusions regarding the future of the SGP. 
2.   Some Empirics and Definitions  
2.1   Development of Deficits in the EU 
Since WWII, Western European countries
6 exhibited a clear upward trend in their 
government spending, which, according to OECD figures, rose from well below 35% of 
GDP in the 1960s to over 55% of GDP in 1993. Since then, however, a reduction can be 
discerned. This increase in spending was mainly driven by rising expenditures for social 
transfers and government consumption. Yet, this overall rise in expenditure was not 
matched by an equivalent increase in taxation. While tax-to-GDP ratios also grew 
considerably, fiscal deficits started to rise at the beginning of the 1970s (see Figure 1) as a 
result of the expansion of the government sector and the occurrence of two oil shocks.  
                                                 
3 As will be shown in section 2.1, successful deficit reduction was mainly achieved by slashing government 
expenditure, not so much by raising revenues. That is why I also speak of fiscal retrenchment when talking 
about deficit reduction. 
4 There is also a rich theoretical and empirical literature that analyses the impact of budget institutions (that is, 
the procedural rules governing formulation, approval and implementation of the budget) on deficits. Even 
though the importance of such institutions is not disputed, they will not be analysed here. This approach has 
already received a rather extensive treatment in the literature. See Hallerberg and von Hagen (1997), Ferejohn 
and Krehbiel (1987), Weingast, Shepsle and Johnsen (1981). For a survey see Drazen (2000).     
5 Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, 
Sweden, UK. Luxembourg has been and throughout will be omitted, for it is the only EU country that has 
almost no government debt, high fiscal surpluses throughout the period under consideration and negative 
interest payments. Therefore, it is an extreme outlier that does not add to the analysis. 
6 Indeed, this trend was common to all industrialized countries of the OECD.    3 
A closer look at Figure 1 reveals  that during the 1990s fiscal policies changed. On average, 
deficits were substantially reduced. However, significant cross-country variation persisted, 
not all states were equally able to reduce their deficits.  
Figure 1: Development of the Government Balance, (unweighted) EU-14 Average, 
1973-1997 
Years




































Source: World Development Indicators; own calculations 
2.2   Definition and Composition of Retrenchment 
Before we can proceed, it is necessary to point out how “retrenchment” is measured and 
defined in this paper. Two indicators are of importance for the further analysis: First, 
“government outlays” (or “government expenditure”) is the annual expenditure of a 
country measured in per cent of GDP. Second, to measure the annual (general)
7 
government fiscal deficit, i.e. the difference between revenues and expenditures, the 
“structural” (“cyclically-adjusted”) deficit
8 is used.  
As a number of studies point out, for a retrenchment to be lasting, i.e. one that is not 
reversed within a few years, the fiscal adjustment has to “rely mostly (or exclusively) on 
spending cuts (…), short-lived adjustments rely mostly on revenue increases” (Alesina, 
Perotti and Tavares 1998, p. 200). Given these insights, a rather strict definition of what 
constitutes a lasting fiscal retrenchment in the EU countries between 1990 and 2001 will be 
employed. In doing so, a combination of both the structural deficit and government outlays 
will be used. The former is needed to control for business cycle movements, the latter is 
used to detect those consolidations that are exclusively based on increases in revenues. The 
                                                 
7 Using the general government deficit (as opposed to central government figures) provides a more complete 
picture, since it also includes sub-national deficits as well as deficits in social security funds. Hence, 
differences in welfare state arrangements and the constitutional structure (federal vs. unitary) are accounted 
for.   
8 This indicator estimates the fiscal deficit that would prevail if the economy was producing at its full-
employment output. This way, the influence of the business cycle can be removed from the data, and revenue 
losses and expenditure hikes due to recessions are thus accounted for. One has to note, however, that this 
indicator is not without its problems. In order to calculate the structural deficit, one has to estimate the 
potential growth rate of an economy which is not directly observable and thus in its calculation very 
dependent on the assumptions made and the methodology employed (see de Brouwer 1998).   4 
first definition thus stipulates: only those instances in which a country reduced its structural 
deficit and/or its government outlays (keeping the other variable constant) for at least 5 
years in a row shall count as a period of real fiscal retrenchment.  
Applying this definition to our EU-14 data for the period 1990-2001 yields the results 
shown in table 1. The table indicates which countries underwent periods of retrenchment. 
Furthermore, the third column shows by how much the cyclically adjusted government 
balance has improved during the period of retrenchment, whereas column 4 depicts by 
how much government outlays were reduced. By definition, if the improvement in the 
structural balance is higher than the reduction in government outlays, then the difference 
between the two indicate an increase in government revenues. For instance, the fact that 
Belgium’s and Italy’s reductions in government expenditure were much lower then their 
increases in their government balances indicates that these two countries consolidated their 
budgets partly via measures that increased revenues. Conversely, a higher reduction in total 
outlays than in the overall deficit indicates decreasing government revenues.  





Change of the Cyclically 
Adjusted Government 
Balance (in % GDP) 
Change in Total 
Government Outlays (in % 
GDP) 
Belgium 1992-1998  +8,2  -0,4 
Denmark 1994-2001  +5,1  -7,4 
Finland 1996-2001  +4,7  -9,8 
Ireland 1991-2000  +5,3  -12 
Italy 1991-1999  +10,8  -7,2 
Netherlands 1995-2000  +6,4  -11,1 
Spain 1995-2001  +4,7  -5 
Sweden 1995-2001  +10,4  -9,7 
United Kingdom  1995-2000  +6,2  -5,2 
Source: OECD, own calculations 
As a control, a second definition will be introduced which is related to the one used by 
Alesina and Ardagna (1998, p. 469). Here, we can speak of a fiscal retrenchment, if in one 
year a country reduced its cyclically adjusted deficit at least by 2% of GDP, or if it reduced 
its deficit by at least 1,5% of GDP in two consecutive years
9. The results of this definition 
are shown in table 2. 
As can be seen, the two tables exhibit some striking differences. The reason is that the 
second definition is both less and more strict at the same time. It is stricter because it 
demands a higher annual deficit reduction than definition I. Therefore, Ireland and Spain 
are no longer part of the table, since they lowered their deficits by smaller annual amounts. 
Another result of this stipulation is that in all countries the number of consecutive years of 
consolidation is now two at most. On the other hand, definition II is less strict in that it 
also counts fiscal retrenchments that lasted for only one or two years, and which could 
                                                 
9 The only difference is that Alesina and Ardagna (1998) use the cyclically adjusted primary balance.   5 
therefore have been reversed the next year. As a result, countries like Austria, Greece and 
Portugal now figure as successful cases of consolidation.  





Change of the Cyclically 
Adjusted Government 
Balance (in % GDP) 
Change in total Government 
Outlays (in % GDP) 
Austria 1996-1997  +3  -2,7 
Belgium 1993-1994  +4,5  +2,1 
Denmark 1999  +2,1  -1,5 
Finland 2000  +3,4  -3 
Greece 1991  +4  -3,6 
Greece 1994  +3,6  -2,1 
Greece 1996-1998  +7,3  -3,8 
Italy 1992-1993  +3,3  +1,5 
Italy 1997 +4,2  -2,8 
Netherlands 1991  +2,9  +0,5 
Netherlands 1996  +2,2  -7,1 
Portugal 1997  +3,8  +0,5 
Sweden 1995-1996  +7,1  -4,9 
Sweden 1998  +2,6  -2,5 
Sweden 2001  +2  -0,3 
United Kingdom  1997-1998  +3,9  -3,2 
Source: OECD, own calculations  
Note that in none of the two definitions France or Germany are considered to have 
undergone periods of fiscal consolidation. But still, definition I seems superior to the 
second one. For one, the latter does rule out important cases like Ireland, which pursued a 
gradual approach to retrenchment which lasted throughout the 1990s. Yet, Ireland is a 
prime example of substantial deficit reduction. Indeed, this approach misses many years of 
gradual retrenchment in all countries. This seems particularly problematic because, as is 
visible from the data, most states actually pursued such a gradual approach over several 
years. Furthermore, definition II also considers very short cases, such as Austria and 
Portugal, whose efforts were quickly reversed in subsequent years. Therefore, they should 
not be counted as cases of successful budgetary retrenchment. For all these reasons, 
emphasis will be put on the first definition, which seems more capable of accounting for 
the gradual character of budgetary consolidation observed in Europe.   
In sum, according to definition I, nine out of fourteen EU countries were able to engage in 
lasting fiscal retrenchment during the 1990s and most did so by reducing expenditures. As 
has been shown before
10, this was mainly achieved by reducing social transfers and 
government consumption.  
Having framed the issue this way, it is time to introduce two political economy 
explanations for deficit reduction and derive some testable hypotheses. 
                                                 
10 See Alesina and Perotti 1997; Alesina and Ardagna 1998; Alesina, Perotti and Tavares 1998   6 
3.   The Partisan Approach 
3.1  The Traditional Partisan Theory by Hibbs 
The partisan theory has been originally formulated by Douglass Hibbs (1977). The model’s 
point of departure is the observation that different socio-economic groups are differently 
affected by growth, unemployment and inflation. Hibbs (1977, p. 1468; 1987, p.87), 
presenting evidence for the U.S., shows that inflation actually benefits lower income groups 
and has an equalizing impact on income distribution. Unemployment, on the other hand, 
shifts income from the poorest two quintiles to the richest two quintiles. Hibbs (1977, p. 
1470) then presents survey evidence which indicates that these socio-economic groups 
indeed utter subjective preferences over inflation and unemployment that are broadly in 
line with their objective economic situations. As a result, low and medium wage earners 
prefer low unemployment (which is brought about by high economic growth) and accept 
higher inflation in return, whereas asset holders and people with above the average wages 
prefer low inflation paid for by higher unemployment.  
Now, in the political arena low and medium income earners are usually represented by left-
wing parties, while upper-middle and upper classes are broadly represented by right-wing 
parties. As Franzese (2002b, p. 391) summarizes, all in all the left can be associated with a 
preference for low unemployment, even income distribution, bigger government spending 
and a greater acceptance of inflation. Right-wing parties, on the other hand, prefer low 
taxes, low government spending, balanced budgets and trade off higher unemployment for 
lower inflation. Analysing cross-national evidence for 12 Western countries as well as time-
series evidence for the U.S. and the UK, Hibbs (1977, p.1468) arrives at the conclusion 
“that the macroeconomic policies pursued by left- and right-wing governments are broadly 
in accordance with the objective economic interests and the subjective preferences of their 
class-defined core political constituencies.” In particular, he finds that the policies of 
British Labour governments led to an on average 0,62% lower unemployment rate as 
compared to when the Conservatives were in power. Similarly, ruling Democrats in the 
U.S. produced a 2,36% lower unemployment rate than Republican administrations (Hibbs 
1977, p.1481, 1486).  
As should have become clear by now, the economy in Hibbs’ model is characterized by a 
Phillips-curve relationship between inflation and unemployment, which can be stated as 
follows : 
   y t = ŷ + πt - πt
e         (4.1) 
Expectations are presumed to be adaptive such that πt
e = πt-1. Macroeconomic policies, 
thus, follow the logic outlined in figure 2. At point A, the economy is at its full-
employment equilibrium (ŭ=ŷ) with the long-run Phillips-curve being horizontal. If the left 
party L wins the election, then it will, in line with the preferences of its constituency, strive 
to lower the unemployment rate. Thus, it will move to point L on the downward sloping 
short-run Phillips-curve. The result will be stronger economic growth and higher inflation. 
If the right-wing party wins the next election, it will move to point R which embodies its   7 
voters’ preferences for low inflation. The consequence will be a recession where 
unemployment grows and inflation falls. It is important to emphasize that Hibbs does not 
consider any shifts in the short-run Phillips-curve due to adjustments in expectations. 
Hence, in his view the short-run is long enough to last for the terms the same party is in 
office.  
So far, we have only looked at economic outcomes but not at fiscal policy and deficit 
reduction. This will be done in sub-section 3.3. Prior to that, however, the partisan model 
will be extended, replacing adaptive with rational expectations. This is not because of an 
empirical weakness of the model. Quite to the contrary, as Franzese (2002b, p. 396) 
concludes, reviewing the literature: “In sum, evidence for partisan outcome cycles of 
worsening nominal and improving real and distributional outcomes under left governments 
generally emerges readily from U.S. and comparative data (...).“ Rather the reason is that 
assuming such a stable short run Phillips curve seems theoretically problematic in light of 
the advances made regarding the role of expectations (see Friedman 1968; Phelps 1970). 
Figure 2: Hibbs’ Partisan Model Framework 
Note: LRPC = Long-run Phillips-curve; SRPC = Short-run Phillips-curve 
Source: Alesina, Roubini and Cohen (1997), p.50 
3.2   Rational Expectations Extension of the Partisan Model 
Alesina, Roubini and Cohen (1997) formulated a partisan model, again based on a Phillips 
curve relationship, where voters’ expectations about future inflation are not adaptive but 
rational, such that 
  πt
e =E(πt | I t-1)         ( 4 . 2 )  
where πt
e denotes expected inflation for period t and I t-1 is the information available to 
voters at the end of period t-1. As in the traditional model, there is a left- and a right-wing 
party that represent the constitutencies laid out above. The parties have the following utility 
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    ∞    
U
i = ∑ α
 t[-(πt – π
i)
2 + b
iyt] 0  <  α < 1      (4.3) 
                               t=0  
with the superscript i=[L,R] denoting the left and the right party and α being the discount 
factor. The term (πt – π
i)
2  describes the inflation target that a party strives to achieve. As 
Alesina, Roubini and Cohen (1997, p. 53) point out, this target can be assumed to be 
positive in any case, since there is clear evidence that inflation has always been used by 
governments as a tax instrument. Finally, b weighs the benefits of growth against the costs 
of inflation. As has been shown in the previous sub-section, the left party cares more about 
growth and low unemployment, while the right is more focused on keeping inflation at low 
levels. Therefore, π
L > π
R  ≥ 0, that is, party L has a higher inflation target than R. 
Furthermore, b
L > b
R ≥ 0 which means that the left-wing party stronger favours growth, 
even at inflationary costs, than its right-wing counterpart. As a result, inflation will always 
be higher under party L than under party R.  
Now, voters are assumed to have the same utility function (4.3) as parties. Thus, voters are 
differing in terms of the amount of inflation they like and how strong they weigh growth 
against inflation. Yet, the distribution of voters with respect to π and b is unknown. Voters, 
on the other hand, know exactly the policy preferences of the parties. Thus, they can easily 
determine the overall inflation rate that will be created if party i is elected by substituting 
the Phillips curve equation (4.1) into parties’ utility function (4.3) and maximizing with 
respect to πt , taking voters’ inflation expectations πt
e as given. Hence, a party i will set 
inflation  
  πt = π
i + b
i/2 ≡ π
i *        (4.4) 
with  π
i* denoting the overall inflation a party produces, which results from the target 
inflation rate and the growth considerations. Voters do not only know the policies the 
respective parties would pursue once elected, but also the probability distribution that the 
left- or the right-wing party will win the election. Given these probabilities and the above 
presumption (4.2) that voters are rational, the electorates’ overall expected inflation for the 




R*       ( 4 . 5 )  
where p is the probability that L wins
11 and accordingly (1-p) denotes the probability that R 
wins the election; π
L* and π
R* capture the two parties’ overall inflation policies. Hence, 
voters take the average of both parties’ policies weighted by their respective probabilities of 
winning as their expected inflation rate that will occur after the election. 
The ensuing dynamic is illustrated in figure 3. Before the elections voters form they 
expectations about future policies according to (4.5). Point A marks the inflation rate that 
                                                 
11 As Alesina et al. (1997, p 569) show, a representative voter will vote for party L if the expected utility he 
receives from an electoral victory of L is higher than if R wins. Formally this can be stated as follows:  
-(πL* – πv)2 + bvyLt + β[- (πL* – πv)2 + bvŷt] > -(πR* – πv)2 + bvyRt + β[- (πR* – πv)2 + bvŷt], with the superscript v 
denoting the representative voter. Thus, p stands for the probability that this inequality holds for more than 
50 percent of the voters.       9 
voters expect. Consequently, wage and credit contracts are made assuming this inflation 
rate. Yet, this is an average expectation. If party L wins, realised inflation will be higher 
than expected. Therefore, unemployment will be temporarily lower and the economy will 
reach point L on the short-run Phillips curve. Given rational expectations, however, voters 
will adjust wage and credit contracts in the next period to the higher inflation rate, thus the 
short-run Phillips curve will shift upwards bringing the economy back to the long-run 
equilibrium unemployment rate. Overall inflation will have risen though and the economy 
is now at point Lt+1. The logic in case of a right-wing electoral victory is analogous. If party 
R wins, actual inflation will be lower than expected. The economy will enter a recession 
with unemployment rising, thus point R on the short-run Phillips curve will be approached. 
In the next period expectations will have adjusted and the curve will shift downwards to 
point Rt+1 where full-employment output is restored but inflation will be lower. 
Figure 3: Partisan Dynamics in a Model with Rational Expectations 
Note: LRPC = Long-run Phillips-curve; SRPC = Short-run Phillips-curve 
Source: own illustration 
It becomes immediately clear that in the rational model, partisan effects on growth and 
unemployment are only short-lived. Once expectations have adjusted, the only thing that 
distinguishes left- from right-wing parties is the level of inflation. From (4.5) it follows that 
the post-electoral economic effects depend on the degree of electoral surprise. If, for 
instance, expected inflation is derived by assuming a high probability of a left-wing victory, 
then a surprise win by R will cause the realised inflation rate to be much lower than 
expected, hence leading to a severe recession. Furthermore, the greater the difference 
between the desired overall inflation of L and R, the bigger will be the post-electoral 
effects. 
In sum, the difference between the traditional Hibbs model and the rational expectations 
variant lies in the persistence of partisan effects, with the latter approach predicting a much 
shorter duration of post-electoral expansions and recessions. Empirical studies have not yet 
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Alesina, Roubini and Cohen (1997, p. 108, 174) find evidence that favour the rational 
model, Franzese (2002b, p. 401-405) is more sceptical, arguing that in most cases the 
traditional model can explain observed patterns equally well. 
So far, however, only partisan effects on economic outcomes have been considered. In the 
next sub-section, it will be shown how fiscal policy and budget deficits can be incorporated.  
3.3   Incorporating Fiscal Policy and Retrenchment 
In principle, a government can use monetary and/or fiscal policy to implement its partisan 
goals regarding output, inflation and unemployment. A large body of literature, emerging in 
the 1990s, argued however, that given a continuing strong integration of capital markets 
and unconstrained capital mobility, partisan fiscal and monetary policy was no longer 
feasible (e.g. Garret and Lange 1991; Kurzer 1993; Scharpf 1991; Simmons 1998). Yet, this 
conclusion seems theoretically dubious. Rather, as the Mundell-Fleming model predicts and 
as several authors have pointed out recently (Boix, 2000; Oatley 1999; Clark and Hallerberg 
2000), in an open economy with free capital flows, the choice of the exchange rate regime 
becomes crucial in determining which policy instruments are still viable. Under fixed 
exchange rates, fiscal policy is still effective in managing the economy while under floating 
exchange rates, it is not. The reverse is true for monetary policy.  
The logic behind this can be briefly illuminated in an IS/LM framework. Assuming an 
open economy with fixed exchange rates, an expansionary fiscal policy would result in an 
increase of aggregate demand. As is illustrated in figure 4, this means that the IS curve will 
shift upwards to IS’. As a result of the greater output, money demand will have increased 
and interest rates will have risen above the world interest rate i*. This entails an increased 
demand for the domestic currency and thus an appreciation of the currency. Since the 
exchange-rate is fixed, the central bank has to intervene and purchases foreign currencies 
to keep the exchange rate stable. This will increase the domestic money supply and push 
the LM curve downwards to LM’. Interest rates will thus be reduced back to the initial 
level. Moreover, as a result of the increased money supply, output will have increased even 
further, moving the economy from E’ to its new equilibrium E’’ . Therefore, a government 
is still able to pursue an independent fiscal policy. Under free floating exchange rates, on 
the other hand, the central bank would not need to intervene, the LM curve would remain 
stable. As a consequence, the exchange rate would appreciate, making domestically 
produced goods and services more expansive vis-à-vis foreign ones. Hence, demand for 
domestic goods (from inside and outside the country) will be reduced, shifting the IS curve 
back to its initial position. As a result, the fiscal stimulus will have been rendered 
ineffective.  
That governments try to take advantage of these opportunities has been empirically 
corroborated. Boix (2000, p. 66) presents evidence for a sample of OCED nations covering 
the period 1960-1993, which shows that under unrestricted capital mobility countries with 
fixed exchange rate regimes had on average significantly higher fiscal deficits than countries 
with a floating currency. There is also some tentative empirical evidence that governments   11  
dominated by the left run larger deficits under fixed exchange rate regimes than right-wing 
governments (Boix 2000, p. 66; Oatley 1999, p. 1014). 
Figure 4: Effects of a Fiscal Expansion with Fixed-Exchange Rates 
Note: i = interest rate; i* = equilibrium (world-) interest rate; Y = output 
Source: Own illustration. 
Applying the same reasoning to monetary policy would show that independent monetary 
policy is only feasible under flexible exchange rates. Under a fixed regime, independent 
monetary policy, which leads to capital flows that put up- or downward pressure on the 
exchange rate, forces the central bank, which is committed to retain a stable exchange rate, 
to reverse its policy move until interest rates are back at their initial (world-) level. Yet, 
monetary policy is not the focus of this paper and therefore it will not be elaborated any 
further. 
In sum, partisan fiscal policy is possible even under perfect capital mobility, given that 
exchange rates are fixed. This applies to most of the countries and the time period 
considered in this paper. In particular, the Eurozone can be considered such a fixed 
exchange rate regime. However, three countries in our sample do not take part in the 
common currency area: Denmark, whose currency is pegged to the Euro via the European 
Exchange rate Mechanism (ERM), using a fluctuation band of 2,25%, and the UK and 
Sweden which have free floating exchange rates. Moreover, before the creation of the Euro 
in 1999, almost all Eurozone members had their exchange rates pegged within the ERM. 
After the ERM crisis in 1992-1993, the fluctuation bands were widened from 2,25% to 
15%, and Italy and the UK left the system (for a lengthy discussion see Tsoukalis 1997, p. 
152-162). Yet, even with the wide fluctuation bands, the system could still be considered a 
fixed exchange rate regime, since “the nine countries which remained in the ERM plus 
Austria which joined in January 1995 and Finland in October 1996 (followed by Italy one 
month later), chose not to take advantage of the wider margins of fluctuation in their 
monetary policy” (Tsoukalis 1997, p. 160). From this and from the prior discussion about 
the two partisan models, we can conclude that different parties once elected not only have 
different preferences, but we can also assume that they have, at least theoretically, the fiscal 
policy means available to pursue their ends.  
E’ 
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Furthermore, even though the UK and Sweden have flexible exchange rates, independent 
fiscal policies are still possible if central banks accommodate the government policy by 
increasing the money supply. One needs to remember that the Bank of England became 
independent only in 1997, whereas the Swedish Riksbank has a comparably low degree of 
independence (Daniels, Nourzad and van Hoose 2004). Also, the fact that a policy proves 
ineffective may not prevent a government from trying it. Hence, we should also expect 
partisan fiscal policies in Sweden and the UK. 
We are now in a position to formulate the first hypothesis regarding the impact of 
partisanship on fiscal retrenchment. The traditional as well as the rational partisan model 
hold that left-wing parties care more about growth and unemployment, whereas right-wing 
parties are more concerned about inflation. Therefore, given that with fixed exchange rates 
and free capital flows, only fiscal policy remains as a viable option, we can expect left 
governments to pursue a more expansionary fiscal policy, to run bigger fiscal deficits and to 
reduce deficits less than their right-wing counterpart. Thus:   
H1:  The higher the share of left-wing party seats in a government, the less likely is that 
government to engage in fiscal retrenchment.  
The reason is that even with an external constraint such as the SGP, the left’s preference is 
always to increase output as much as possible. The right-wing party, on the other hand, 
likes low inflation and is thus much more ready to retrench the budget. Note that we need 
not to distinguish between the traditional partisan model and the rational one because we 
are only concerned here with policy instruments, not with economic outcomes. Hence, the 
extent and duration of the real economic effects of these fiscal policies are of no concern 
here. 
This  hypothesis has been derived from the traditional and rational partisan model, which 
are both based on the notion of an exploitable Phillips curve. The next sub-section will 
present a different partisan approach that yields quite a contrary hypothesis. 
3.4  Debt as a Strategic Variable 
Another partisan approach emphasizes the strategic role that debt may play in constraining 
future governments’ latitude (Aghion and Bolton 1990; Alesina and Tabellini 1990; Milesi-
Feretti and Spoalore 1994; Persson and Svensson 1989). The basic notion of this approach 
is that a government with rational foresight might expect electoral defeat. Given that it 
does not like the policies that the successor government will implement, it may choose to 
accumulate debt and thus forces the future government to spend resources on servicing the 
debt instead of pursuing its ideological goals. Whereas Alesina and Tabellini (1990) are 
considering a model with two different parties that have different preferences over how to 
spend the budget, Persson and Svensson (1989) present a model with two parties that 
prefer different levels of spending. Given that Persson and Svensson make clearer 
predictions about the role of partisanship, their model shall be briefly illuminated.   13  
The authors consider a two-period model, with a right-wing government being in power in 
the first period. After this period, elections are held and the left wins, thus holding office in 
period 2. The right is assumed to prefer low spending, while the left likes high government 
spending. This is fairly in line with the behavioural assumptions made above, where we 
presumed that the left is expansionary in order to achieve lower unemployment and higher 
growth, while the right is more concerned about inflation and likes low taxation. As 
Persson and Svensson (1989) show, if the right-wing government expects to be replaced 
after the next election, then it has an incentive to lower taxes and take on debt, i.e. to run 
deficits, to burden its left-wing successor with the need to service the debt. As a result, the 
left, once in power, has fewer resources available to spend, since “government 
consumption is a decreasing function of the inherited debt” (p. 333).  
Note, that the right actually dislikes deficits, yet it also dislikes high spending. Thus, the 
extent to which the right-wing government runs deficits depends on how “stubborn” it is. 
“Stubbornness” refers to how the government weighs the disutility of higher future 
spending by its successor against the disutility from the ensuing tax distortion. This 
distortion emerges because the right lowers taxes in the current period more than it would, 
remained it in power. To service the debt, the left will raise taxes more than it would 
without the debt. As a consequence, taxation will not be stable as is prescribed by the tax 
smoothing model. The more “stubborn” the right-wing government is, the more ready it is 
to accumulate debt and to bear the losses caused by tax distortions in order to prevent the 
successor from high spending. Persson and Svensson (1989, p. 341) emphasize that the 
logic of this argument is perfectly symmetric: “ a ‘stubborn’ liberal would choose to borrow 
less if it knew if would be succeeded by a more conservative government.” This way, the 
left government could lower debt servicing costs or even create additional funds if it leaves 
surpluses to the future government, thus increasing future government spending.
12  
Governments are all the more inclined to act according to the model’s predictions, the 
more likely it is that they will be replaced after the next election. However, governments 
might very well also behave this way, even if they do not expect to be replaced soon but 
simply have a long time horizon, since sooner or later in a democracy the opponent will 
come to power. The large deficits accumulated by U.S. president Reagan in the 1980s can 
be considered an example for a right-wing government trying to tie the hands of successors 
for a long time to come
13 (Persson and Svensson 1989, p. 337-339). 
As a result, this model yields the rather counterintuitive prediction that the right is more 
likely to run deficits, while the left is more prone to reduce them. It follows as a second 
hypothesis: 
                                                 
12 Note that if the right uses these surpluses for tax cuts, then this is also in the interest of the left, since it 
means an expansionary fiscal policy that furthers the left-wing party’s goals regarding growth an employment.  
13 As a New York Times article (25th January 1987) read, citing Reagan’s Budget Chief David Stockmann: 
“This deficit is no despised orphan. It is President Reagan’s child and secretly he loves it (…) The deficit 
rigorously discourages any idea of spending another dime for social welfare.”    14  
H2: The higher the share of right-wing party seats in a government, the less likely is that 
government to engage in fiscal retrenchment. 
Having explicated the predictions that follow from the partisan theory, it is now time to 
turn to the potential role that political institutions may play in determining the 
possibility of fiscal retrenchment. 
4.  The Veto Players Approach 
4.1  The Basic Framework 
The fundamental goal of the veto players theory is to explain policy stability and policy 
change, employing the tools and intuition of spatial models of voting. The focus lies on the 
decision-making process of political actors. Hence, this approach assumes policy oriented 
actors. As a result, strategic interaction between them is largely neglected. In contrast to 
other approaches such as political business cycle models, this theory presumes therefore 
that policy makers care about implementing their desired policies, but not to win elections 
per se. Given a certain amount of information, this approach aims at enabling the 
researcher to predict specific legislative outcomes of the political process.  
Veto players are all those actors that have the constitutionally assigned power to veto a 
policy proposal in the legislative process. They can be either institutional (e.g. different 
chambers of parliament) or partisan (e.g. different parties in parliament or in government) 
in nature. Moreover, veto players can be individual (such as a president or a monolithic 
party controlling the parliament) or collective (such as a parliament or a government 
composed of several parties that have to determine their position by using some kind of 
decision rule). Other actors, like interest groups for instance, that have no formal veto 
power assigned to them by a country’s constitution but do exhibit informal influence on 
the political process are excluded from the analysis.  
Tsebelis presents his argument in one- and two-dimensional policy spaces. Yet, he claims 
that his arguments and findings can be generalized “in any number of dimensions” (p. 28). 
Moreover, in presenting his argument, he throughout assumes that actors weigh different 
issues equally strong, that is, different issues in the policy space have the same salience. In 
addition, Tsebelis assumes actors’ preferences to be separable between different issues at 
stake. As a result, actors’ indifference curves around their ideal points in the policy space 
are taken to be circular. Any point on such a curve is equally valued by an actor, since the 
simple Euclidean distance
14 to the ideal point is the same for every point on this curve. If 
we allowed for non-separable preferences and dissimilar salience, then indifference curves 
would be no longer circular but could take on a variety of elliptic forms, making the 
analysis much more complicated.  
                                                 
14 For any number of dimensions n, the simple Euclidean distance (SED) between two points x and y can be 
calculated as follows (Hinich and Munger 1997, p. 78):   
                      ____________              n 
      SED(x,y)=√∑(xj – yj)2 
                   j=1    15  
However, given these assumptions, policy stability and policy change depend crucially on 
the size of the win set
15 and the core
16. The bigger the size of the win set, the more feasible 
alternatives exist to the status quo, and consequently, the more likely is a policy change. On 
the other hand though, the bigger the size of the core, the more policy positions exist that 
cannot be changed, and hence the less likely is a policy change
17. As a result, policy stability 
and policy change are functions of the sizes of the core and the win set.
18 Tsebelis identifies 
those factors that influence the size of core and win-set, and thus, the likelihood and the 
extent of policy changes. These shall be briefly presented in turn. 
Figure 5 depicts a two-dimensional policy space (for two arbitrary issues) with four veto 
players, whose bliss points are indicated by A, B, C, and D. First, let’s ignore D and only 
consider the other three actors. Given that the status quo is SQ1, the win set is the hatched 
area. All points inside this region can beat SQ1 and can thus constitute a new policy. 
Therefore, policy change is possible. The triangle ABC represents the unanimity core that 
comprises all policy positions that cannot be changed. If SQ2 was the status quo, then 
there would be no win set, since the intersection of the three indifference curves yields no 
hatched area. In this case the win set is empty (W(SQ2)= Ø) and policy change is 
impossible.  
Now, Tsebelis’ (1995; 2002) most fundamental finding is that the size of the core and the 
win set depend on the ideological distance between the veto players, their number, and 
their cohesion. These three variables have the potential to explain not only the occurrence 
of policy change but also its direction and its extent. Let’s again assume that SQ1 is the 
status quo and that there are three actors A, B, C. If C moves up and to the left, that is, 
further away from A and B (as is indicated by the arrow), then the win set shrinks. The new 
indifference curve of C is the dotted one, and the win set has shrunk by about a third as 
this new indifference curve has moved upwards
19. Therefore, policy stability increases with 
the ideological distance of the veto players. 
Similarly, an increase in number of veto players also increases stability and hinders 
policy change. This effect can be illustrated by adding a fourth actor D in figure 5. Once 
we do not only consider A, B, and C but also take D into account, the win set again 
                                                 
15“The win set of a given status quo z (written W(z)) is the set of alternatives that will garner more votes than 
z in a pairwise majority rule election” (Hinich and Munger 1997, p. 62). Put simply, the win set contains all 
policy positions that are preferred by a majority (however defined) of actors to the status quo. 
16The core contains all policy positions that cannot be defeated employing a given decision-making rule. 
Note, that the core is only equal to the pareto set, if the employed decision-making procedure is unanimity 
(then, we speak of the unanimity core). Once, some other form of majority voting is used, the core is 
different from the pareto set. However, most of the time the unanimity core will be used given that the very 
concept of a veto player entails that he cannot be overruled. 
17Note, however, that the size of the win set and the core are “a necessary but not sufficient condition for 
proximity of the new policy with the status quo” (Tsebelis 2002, p.32) Hence, even though a large win set 
makes a policy far away from the status quo possible, it does not rule out that the new policy represents only 
an incremental change from the status quo. 
18 Note that core and win set almost always behave equivalently, with the win set shrinking as the core 
expands  and vice versa (Tsebelis 2002, p. 29).  
19 The unanimity core has also expanded. This could be seen if one extended the triangle to the new position 
of C. This is not done in the figure, in order not to complicate the picture even more.   16  
shrinks significantly. Now only those policy positions that lie within the cross-hatched 
area can beat SQ1. In addition, the unanimity core expands, as is indicated by the dotted 
lines, to comprise now the area ABCD. Hence, there are more policy positions that 
cannot be defeated by any other position. Yet, there is one restriction to this finding. As 
Tsebelis (2002, p. 28) proves, an increase in the number of veto players does not affect 
win set and core if the new actor is located inside the already existing unanimity core. In 
this case his position is “absorbed” by the other veto players and has no effect on policy 
stability. 
 
Figure 5: Veto Players and Policy Change in a Two-dimensional Policy Space 
 Source: Own illustration. 
Hence, a more precise prediction is to say, that an increase in the number of veto players 
reduces the win set, or leaves it the same; but it definitely does not increase it.  
The final variable that influences the win set is cohesion. Cohesion refers to collective veto 
players such as a parliament made up of several parties. In particular, the greater the 
cohesion of a collective veto player, the smaller is the ideological distances between the 
individual actors that constitute this veto player. In the above example, veto players were 
monolithic or internally deciding by unanimity and had, thus, clear policy positions and 
indifference curves. In the case of collective actors, however, policy positions are the result 
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to the well-known problem of cycling preferences
20, where outcomes solely depend on the 
order of voting and are unstable (Hinich and Munger 1997, pp. 37-41). Therefore, 
collective veto players’ preferences cannot be expressed through circular curves because 
the outcome for every possible majority within the collective actor has to be taken into 
account.  
In order to cope with this problem, Tsebelis introduces the concept of the “wincircle”, 
which is “a circle that contains the winset of the status quo by majority rule” (p.61). This 
wincircle allows treating collective veto players approximately the same way as the 
individual ones described above, that is, this way we can create circular indifference curves 
around them.
21 Tsebelis distinguishes between simple and qualified majority decision rules 
and arrives at opposite conclusions. In the case of simple majority voting, increasing 
cohesion leads to a smaller wincircle and thus to higher policy stability. Hence, in this case 
policy change is harder to come by and smaller in its extent. However, if decisions within 
the collective veto player are reached by qualified majority rule, then an increase in the 
cohesion of this actor leads to a bigger wincircle and therefore to less policy stability. 
Moreover, given a certain cohesion, the higher the majority threshold of a voting 
procedure, the smaller the wincircle, and thus, the higher policy stability. 
To summarize, policy stability and policy change in a political system depend crucially on 
the size of actors’ win sets and their cores. These are affected by the ideological distance 
between veto players, their number and their cohesion. However, of these three variables, 
only the number of veto players can be easily operationalized in empirical studies, since so 
far there is no data available that measures internal cohesion of parties. With respect to 
ideological distance, there are some studies (Cusack 1997, 1999; Franzese 2002a) that try to 
measure this variable by creating indices that capture the “Centre of Gravity” of parties.
22 
Yet, even these measures rely on expert judgements that try to order parties on a left-right 
scale. Given that exact distances become crucial for this analysis, it is doubtful that experts 
can exactly locate parties’ positions.
23 Therefore, these indices remain to a considerable 
extent subjective and, thus, disputable. As a result, the number of veto players emerges as 
the only variable that can be readily observed by examining a country’s constitution and the 
parties acting within the political system. Moreover, in his empirical analysis, Franzese 
(2002a, pp. 175-178) finds that once one controls for the number of veto players, their 
ideological distance becomes statistically insignificant. For these reasons, only the number 
                                                 
20 This is the famous “Condorcet paradoxon”, named after the French mathematician Marquis de Condorcet 
(1743-1794).  
21 For a formal derivation of the wincircle see Tsebelis (2002, pp. 45-47, 51-53). This derivation is not 
replicated here, since for methodological reasons explained below, cohesion cannot contribute to explain the 
questions raised in this paper. 
22 The “Centre of Gravity” index captures a party’s position Ci on a left-right scale and its relative numerical 
strength Ti in parliament or government. Formally (Cusack 1999, p.473),                 n 
G = ∑Ti Ci 
                   i=1 
23 It is not disputed here, that one can easily distinguish parties concerning their overall ideology and policy 
goals. What seems highly dubious is to exactly locate their position in a n-dimensional policy space.   18  
of veto players will be henceforth considered as an explanatory variable for explaining fiscal 
retrenchment. 
4.2  Veto Players and Fiscal Retrenchment 
Having explicated the basic veto players framework, it is now time to apply it to the 
question of fiscal retrenchment and to derive a testable hypothesis. In the analysis that 
follows, a two-dimensional policy space will again be employed, with the Y-axis denoting 
spending on social transfers, while the X-axis captures government consumption. It is 
these two budget items that are considered because as was shown in section 2.1, the vast 
majority of European countries that were able to engage in successful budgetary 
retrenchment, did so by slashing mainly these two items. However, the logic applies to any 
number of dimensions, so that theoretically all budget items could be simultaneously 
considered, yet, this would make graphical exposition impossible. In the example used 
here, the status quo is a situation in which the budget is in deficit. Actors choose to 
retrench the budget (and thus lower the deficit), if they decrease spending on one or both 
items; or if spending on one item is more rigorously lowered than it is raised on the other 
one. Hence, actors have to decide whether they want to keep the deficit at current levels, 
whether they want to increase it, or whether they reduce it. If they choose to lower the 
deficit, then they must make up their mind how to do so.  
The situation is illustrated in figure 6. Note that the point of origin is denoted with 
minimum instead of 0. The reason is that it is realistic to assume that there are certain 
minimum floors regarding social spending and government consumption that are 
constitutionally protected or necessary to run the state and cannot be changed discretely. 
SQ is the prevailing status quo for spending on social transfers and government 
consumption, with the overall budget being in deficit. First, the government G makes a 
proposal which is its bliss point. In this context it makes no difference whether it is a single 
party or coalition government (the latter case will be dealt with in the next sub-section). As 
can be seen, it is assumed that the government would like to reduce the deficit by lowering 
social transfers, but it prefers to keep the level of spending on government consumption 
stable. If the government was the only veto player, that is, if it would have quasi-dictatorial 
power, then it could implement its bliss point G. However, in a democracy there is always a 
parliament, denoted P in the figure, which has to cast a vote on the government’s proposal. 
As the figure illustrates, the parliament also prefers to lower the budget deficit, but it would 
rather achieve this goal by keeping social spending constant and lowering government 
consumption instead. The resulting policy outcome is different from G and lies somewhere 
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Figure 6: Veto Players and Fiscal Retrenchment  
Source: Own illustration. 
Note that proximity of the parliament’s majority bliss point to the one of the government 
depends on the legislative cohesion of the supporting majority, which in European 
parliamentary systems is rather high.
24 Unlike in pure presidential systems (e.g. the U.S.) 
where the executive is independent of the parliament, European governments need to be 
upheld by a majority in parliament because all European states have either a semi-
presidential or parliamentarian regime
25. Hence, the threat of a government break-up will 
ensure strong legislative cohesion among the governing parties in a parliamentary system 
(see Diermeier and Feddersen 1998; Persson, Roland and Tabellini 1999) As a result, the 
government and its majority in parliament are most likely to find a common policy position 
that is different from SQ but not to far away from the government’s ideal point. Since 
agenda setting power in a parliamentary system is usually exerted by the government 
(Tsebelis 2002, p. 82), we can expect X to be the policy that will be chosen in this situation, 
for within the win set it is the point closest to G.  
  In some European nations, legislation has to be approved by a second chamber of 
parliament. In figure 6, we assume that the majority in the second chamber C would like to 
increase social transfer and to lower government consumption. This new veto player 
dramatically reduces the win set, which is the cross-hatched area. Now, fiscal retrenchment 
is only possible to a very limited extent (smaller than the government envisioned) and 
                                                 
24 However, in some countries (such as currently Sweden) we frequently observe minority governments. In 
that case we can expect legislative cohesion to be lower, since the government needs to secure a majority on a 
issue-by-issue basis.  
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mainly via cuts in government consumption. Yet, the story may not end here. Some EU 
countries (Austria, Belgium, Germany, Italy, and Spain) are federal systems. Here the 
federal states may have the opportunity to run deficits
26 themselves or engage in log-rolling 
over pork barrel projects due to common pool problems (Weingast, Shepsle and Johnsen 
1981). As a result, some federal states may wish to spend more on both dimensions.
27 
Hence the position of the fourth veto player is F. Now the win set is empty, that is, 
changing the status quo with four veto players turns out to be impossible. This can also be 
seen by looking at the unanimity core GCPF, depicted by the dotted lines. SQ lies within 
the core, and thus cannot be beaten by any other policy position. Hence, the status quo is a 
pareto-equilibrium
28 and the political system turns out to be incapable of fiscal 
retrenchment. 
It needs to be stressed that the case depicted in figure 6 is a theoretical example. Actors 
may have very different preferences and different distances to each other. Therefore, it may 
very well be that even with four veto players there is still a win set and a deviation from SQ 
therefore possible. Also, the win set may already be empty in the presence of only, let’s say, 
three veto players. Policy stability therefore depends to a certain extent on the 
configuration of preferences. The point to be made here is that, on average, we should 
expect that the likelihood of fiscal retrenchment decreases as the number of institutional 
veto players increases. Thus, the third hypothesis posits: 
H3: The higher the number of institutional veto players, the less likely is a country to 
engage in fiscal retrenchment, and the smaller is its deficit reduction. 
It is worthwhile to emphasize that this hypothesis does not imply that countries with a high 
number of veto players do necessarily have high deficits and debts. Theoretically, many 
veto players could lead to low deficits because huge spending increases or tax cuts are 
prevented by the small win set that may exist in a system with many veto players. But one 
could also arrive at the opposite prediction: a government may be forced to make huge 
side-payments to other veto players in order to achieve its goals. This reasoning could lead 
one to expect that many veto players are associated with high deficits. However, all what is 
claimed here is that an increasing number of veto players is associated with an increasing 
stability of the status quo (which is a budget deficit), and therefore makes fiscal 
retrenchment harder to achieve. This view resonates with Franzese’s (2002a, pp. 176) 
empirical finding, that “veto actors induce inaction.” 
                                                 
26 Remember that the general budget deficit also includes the deficits run by sub-national entities. 
27 Note that often the second chamber in federal systems represents the interests of the federal states. In this 
case it may be the case that the position of the second chamber is equal to that of the federal states. Yet, it 
is also feasible to assume that given a certain degree of fiscal autonomy, the position of federal states is 
different from the one of the second chamber. Single states may pursue policies that run counter to the 
ones pursued at the federal level, thus this veto player accounts for fiscal decentralization. Moreover, there 
are countries with bicameral legislatures that are not federal states.      
28 Given unanimity rule, a deviation from the equilibrium is impossible, since any change would at least leave 
one actor worse off.    21  
4.3  Weak Governments / Delayed Stabilization 
The previous sub-section dealt with institutional veto players, considering the government 
a monolithic actor. However, very often the government is composed of more than one 
party. Thus, intra-governmental dynamics may have an impact on fiscal retrenchment. 
Starting with two seminal articles by Roubini and Sachs (1989a, b), a large empirical 
literature has emerged since the beginning of the 1990s, which examines the impact of 
government fractionalisation on deficits. Yet, the empirical findings were very mixed. 
Roubini and Sachs (1989a,b), who used an ordinal variable to distinguish between single- 
coalition- and minority governments, found that the higher the number of parties in 
government, the higher the deficits. Edin and Ohlsson (1991) insisted that this finding can 
be completely attributed to the effects of minority governments. Hence, only minority 
governments run particularly high deficits. Still other, more recent empirical analyses 
yielded no significant relationship between the number of government parties and fiscal 
deficits (de Haan and Sturm 1997; de Haan, Sturm and Beekhuis 1999; Sakamoto 2001). 
However, most of these studies are largely empirical and do not distinguish properly 
between levels of deficits and the process of fiscal retrenchment.  
Deficit reduction has been explicitly analysed in a more theoretical literature that has also 
emerged at the beginning of the 1990s (Alesina and Drazen 1991; Spoalore 1993). These 
authors model intra-governmental negotiations between coalition partners over fiscal 
retrenchment as a “war of attrition”
29. The basic notion is that every coalition party would 
like to shift the burden of fiscal adjustment onto the other parties’ constituencies. As a 
consequence, every coalition members has an incentive to block a solution and tries to wait 
the others out. Thus, no fiscal retrenchment takes place, although everyone agrees that it is 
necessary. This situation is only resolved if one or several partners give in and bear a 
disproportionate burden of the costs, whereas the winner, the one who did not give in, has 
to bear the smallest share. 
Alesina and Drazen (1991) develop a war of attrition model where two societal groups 
bargain over who has to bear the costs of fiscal consolidation in a small open economy. 
Yet, their analysis also holds for coalition partners instead of socio-economic groups, if we 
assume that different parties represent different groups. At time t, an exogenous shock 
leads to a fall in government revenues and thus a deficit. The deficit is financed in part (1- 
η) by issuing debt and another fraction η is financed via distortionary taxation (such as an 
inflation tax for instance). Debt is therefore, 
  d(t)  =  (1- η) [rd(t)+gt-1]      ( 5 . 1 )  
where d denotes debt, r is the (constant) world interest rate and gt-1 describes the level of 
government spending before the exogenous shock occurs. Note that Alesina and Drazen 
(1991) assume that fiscal consolidation occurs through increases in taxation. However, their 
                                                 
29 War of attrition models have been extensively used to describe conflict situations between labour unions 
and central banks (Backus and Driffill 1985a, b; Tabellini 1988), as well as between fiscal and monetary policy 
makers (Sargent 1986; Tabellini 1987).   22  
arguments and results also hold, if we presume that the deficit will be lowered by reducing 
government spending, which is the focus of this paper.
30 Consequently, a retrenchment 
takes place when expenditure is lowered to such an extent that the level of debt will remain 
constant, that is, deficits are reduced to zero
31:  
  g t = τt - rdt         (5.2) 
with subscript t denoting the time when the retrenchment takes place and τ being the tax 
rate which will remain unchanged. Now, the bargaining between the coalition members 
starts over who has to bear the expenditure cuts. More precisely, given that all parties have 
different constituencies, it needs to be decided which societal group will get less of future 
public spending.
32 The utility function u that each party i maximizes is 
  u i,t = ci,t - y - Ki,t       ( 5 . 3 )  
where c is private consumption, y captures income which is assumed to be constant 
throughout, and K is the cost for every party (and its followers) to live another instant in an 
economy that is in deficit. K differs between the parties and is given by 
  K i,t = φi τt        ( 5 . 4 )  
in which φ captures the utility loss due to the distortionary taxation (the inflation tax) that is 
partially used to cover the deficit. As becomes clear from (5.4), the welfare costs of an 
economy in debt increases linearly with the level of taxes one has to pay. Once the fiscal 
retrenchment takes place, Ki=0.  
Of course, the longer the coalition members wait to enact a retrenchment, the higher are 
the costs as the distortionary taxation rises with the debt servicing costs. In addition, there 
are also political costs associated with fighting for a solution that favours ones own 
clientele. Now, every party will block a solution as long as the marginal benefit from 
waiting is higher than the marginal cost of distortions associated with the accumulation of 
debt. The marginal benefit is defined by the probability that the opponent(s) will give in 
very soon times the higher utility that is derived from winning the war of attrition, which is 
the smaller retrenchment costs the winner has to pay compared to the loser(s). It is 
important to stress that each party only knows its own costs of living in a state of 
accelerating debt. If everyone knew each others’ costs of waiting, then everybody could 
calculate each others’ time until concession takes place, and the war of attrition would not 
take place, since the ”loser” would know from the beginning that he is the loser and would 
hence immediately give in to save the costs of living in a distorted economy. 
Within this framework, Alesina and Drazen derive a number of parameters that determine 
how long retrenchment is delayed in a political system. First of all, the more unequal the 
                                                 
30 As a result, in contrast to Alesina and Drazen, taxes remain constant while expenditures are the decisive 
variable here. 
31 The model assumes for simplicity that there is no economic growth. 
32 If different constituencies are geographically defined, this could mean that some group will get less public 
goods, like new infrastructure, in the future. If they are defined in socio-economic terms, than this could 
mean that some will get less government transfers in the future.   23  
distribution of fiscal costs associated with deficit reduction, the longer the delay. The 
reason is that the benefit from waiting, as defined above, increases if the utility from being 
the “winner” is significantly larger than the utility derived from giving in. The authors 
interpret the degree of inequity in the distribution of costs as a proxy for political cohesion 
in a country. Therefore, they conclude that the more unequal this distribution is, the less 
cohesive is a society. Furthermore, consolidation will also be longer postponed, the lower 
the distortionary costs of accumulating debts are. Also, in applying a war of attrition model 
directly to coalition governments, Spoalore (1993) finds, that deficit reduction takes longer 
to be agreed on, the higher the number of coalition partners, whereas single-party 
governments react much quicker and more decisively. In the context of the model by 
Alesina and Drazen (1991), this is explained by the fact that a high number of parties 
increases the probability that there are at least two parties with high marginal benefits 
derived from waiting, being in a deadlock. This deadlock will only be resolved when all 
parties but one concede, with the last party holding out being the winner. Moreover, the 
more parties there are, the higher is fractionalisation, and thus the more unequal is the 
societal distribution of the costs of retrenchment. As explicated above, this inequity leads, 
ceteris paribus, to a longer delay in deficit reduction. Note, that we can also expect 
consolidation to be smaller than is prescribed by tax-smoothing because the parties may be 
tempted to retrench less in order to lower the burden the loser(s) have to bear in an 
attempt to induce the loser(s) to concede faster. As a result, we can formulate the final 
hypothesis: 
H4: The higher the number of parties that participate in government, the less likely is a 
fiscal retrenchment.  
Modelling intra-governmental conflict over retrenchment as a war of attrition is pretty 
much in line with the veto players approach. Indeed, parties could be modelled in spatial 
terms as partisan veto players. If we assume the four actors in figure 6 to be coalition 
partners, then we see that the win set is empty and retrenchment is infeasible. However, the 
war of attrition model, in contrast to the veto players theorem by Tsebelis, is dynamic. As 
time elapses and the cost of accumulating debts rises, actors start shifting their positions. If 
we assume party G to be the winner in the war of attrition, the other three parties will 
concede and move their positions toward the ideal point of G. Yet, employing a spatial 
illustration shows that the losers may not need to surrender completely but only move 
towards the winner’s bliss point in order to create a non-empty win-set. This stands in 
contrast to Alesina and Drazen, whose model leaves no room for political compromise, but 
rather assume total surrender by the loser(s). As a result, both variants of the veto players 
approach are not mutually exclusive but rather complementary. The war of attrition model 
adds a dynamic element to the analysis, while the spatial veto players theorem is able to 
explain the occurrence of political compromise. 
In sum, section 4 has applied the veto players approach to the issue of fiscal retrenchment. 
In doing so, it has derived two hypotheses regarding the role of institutional actors in   24  
general and of partisan veto players within governments. Before we proceed to the next 
section which empirically tests all hypotheses, we reiterate them in table 3. 




H1:The higher the share of left-wing party seats in a 
government, the less likely is that government to 
engage in fiscal retrenchment. 
 
traditional/rational partisan approach 
H2: The higher the share of right-wing party seats in 
a government, the less likely is that government to 
engage in fiscal retrenchment. 
partisan / debt as a strategic variable 
H3: The higher the number of institutional veto 
players, the less likely is a country to engage in fiscal 
retrenchment, and the smaller is its deficit reduction.
veto players approach / spatial model 
H4: The higher the number of parties that participate 
in government, the less likely is a fiscal retrenchment.
veto players approach / war of attrition model 
 
5.   Testing the Hypotheses 
In this section, the hypotheses derived above will be empirically tested employing time-
series cross-section (TSCS) analyses of a data set comprising 14 EU countries
33 for the 
period from 1990-2001. However, since pooled data carry a number of caveats and 
difficulties (see Beck and Katz 1995; Beck 2001; Plümper, Manow and Troeger 2003), 
estimation and specification issues have to be discussed thoroughly. But first of all, sub-
section 5.1 will take a closer look at the data and will specify the variables needed for the 
empirical examinations.  
5.1   Data and Variables 
The data has been moulded into two data sets. There is one TSCS set that contains all 
countries for the whole period under consideration. The other one is also TSCS data, but it 
only contains those countries and those periods in which retrenchment according to the 
first definition given in section 2.2 actually took place; in other words, it represents pooled 
retrenchment periods (see tables 1). The reason for doing so is that the complete TSCS 
data set may conceal effects of variables that are particularly important only in times of 
fiscal consolidation. For instance, as has been argued above, veto players may inhibit deficit 
reduction but their effects on deficit levels are less clear. Thus, pooling only those years in 
which retrenchment actually took place, might be useful in order to distinguish between the 
dynamics of deficit expansion and deficit reduction. 
Now, it is time to specify dependent and independent variables.
34 The dependent variable 
will be the annual change in government expenditures, named “∆OUTLAYS”. A second 
variable to be tested is a dummy. This dummy assumes the value “1”, if a given country 
                                                 
33 Luxembourg is still excluded. 
34 A full list of definitions and sources of the variables is provided in the annex.    25  
engaged in fiscal retrenchment in a given year, while the dummy assumes the value “0” for 
all those instances that do not belong to a period of deficit reduction. For our two 
definitions, there are thus two dummies, “D1” and “D2”. This is the most straightforward 
way to test for the factors that facilitate or inhibit retrenchment as it is defined in this 
paper. 
To control for the economic determinants of fiscal retrenchment, a number of economic 
variables is employed. Partly following the empirical literature (Alesina, Roubini and Cohen 
1997; de Haan and Sturm 1997; Franzese 2002a; Sakamoto 2001; Woo 2003), five 
economic controls are introduced: real GDP growth: “GDP”; the standardized (according 
to OECD definition) unemployment rate: “UE”; tax revenues in percent of GDP: “TAX”; 
the overall debt level in percent of GDP: “DEBT”; and the long-term interest rate: 
“LTERMINT”. Growth, unemployment and tax revenue capture the effects of recessions 
and booms on deficits. The debt level and the interest rate, on the other hand, control for 
the debt servicing costs. Since EU-14 nations have a common trade regime and do not 
differ very much in their demographics, factors such as the old-age dependency ratio or 
trade openness used in part of the literature (Franzese 2002a; Woo 2003) are neglected. 
This is also warranted by the rather brief time span considered here, which is too short to 
reflect the impact of changing demographics on social expenditure.  
To test for partisan effects on deficits, several variables are employed. First of all, 
“GOVLEFT”, “GOVCENTER” and “GOVRIGHT” are the respective percentage shares 
of left-, centre- and right-wing parties in government.
35 Also, their respective share in 
parliament is captured by “PLEFT”, “PCENTER” and “PRIGHT”.  
Two variables are used to capture the effects of veto players on deficits. First of all, the 
additive indicator “POWER” measures the impact of the federal structure of a country, the 
number of parliamentary chambers, and the regime type (presidential or parliamentarian). 
The indicator ranges from 0 to six, and increases with the concentration of power in a 
country. This means that the more veto players there are, the lower is this indicator’s 
value.
36 Hence, the highest value can be found in countries with a unitary structure, no 
president and a unicameral legislature. A value of “0”, on the other hand, would be found 
in a country that has a pure presidential system, a federal structure and two chambers of 
parliament.
37 Second, in order to test hypothesis number 4, the variable “NOP”, which 
denotes the number of parties in government, is included.  
                                                 
35 Centrist (Christian democratic) parties pose a particular problem, since it is not clear whether they should 
be lumped together with the left or the right regarding fiscal policy preferences. Wilensky (1981) assumes the 
former because centrist parties have a history of supporting welfare state expansion.  
36 For specifics about the coding see the annex. 
37 Note that there is no such case in the sample employed here because a pure presidential system does not 
exist in any EU-14 country.   26  
5.2  Time-Series Cross-Section Analyses 
5.2.1  Some Notes on Methodology 
TSCS data represent repeated observations of a fixed number of units. However, OLS 
analysis of TSCS data is far more problematic than cross-sectional regressions. The reason 
is that pooled data sets commonly violate the OLS assumptions about the error process. In 
particular, TSCS errors often exhibit panel heteroskedasticity, contemporaneous correlation 
and serial correlation.  
In order to deal with the problems of heteroskedacticity and contemporaneous correlation, 
I specify an OLS regression with Panel Corrected Standard Errors (PCSE)
38 as suggested in 
the literature (Beck 2001, Beck and Katz 1997) and for the logit model I calculate white 
heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors (White 1980). In addition, in case of 
autocorrelation, an error correction model is used which entails a Prais-Winston 
transformation of the data, employing a  common first-order autoregressive process AR(1). 
For theoretical reasons though, fixed effects are not included. The reason is twofold. First, 
the variable “POWER” is time-invariant and would thus be controlled away by fixed 
effects. Second, since a number of partisan variables are of particular interest here, we have 
to assume that level effects matter. It simply makes no sense to assume that a 10 percent 
increase in the share of left parties in government has the same effect in a country, where 
the left already holds 70 percent of cabinet seats and in a country where it had previously 
no seats. But this is exactly what fixed effects do, since they abstract from differences in 
levels. This is, of course, a serious caveat, since without fixed effects we cannot really 
account for unit heterogeneity. However, there simply does not exist a solution to this 
dilemma of TSCS analyses yet (Wilson and Butler 2004). 
5.2.2  Specification and Estimation of the Models 
In this sub-section, it will be estimated which factors affected likelihood and extent of fiscal 
retrenchment. This will be done in two steps. First, the full TSCS data set will be analysed 
in order to find the variables that determined whether or not a country underwent a period 
of fiscal retrenchment, as it has been defined in 2.2. Therefore, a logit regression model will 
be estimated with the dependent variable being a dummy that simply denotes whether a 
country in a given year engaged in budgetary consolidation. It has been shown that deficit 
reduction in the EU-14 nations was mainly achieved via cuts in government outlays. Thus, 
we are interested in isolating those factors that were especially conducive for slashing 
public expenditures. To do this, a sub-sample of the TSCS data, that pools only all those 
years in which retrenchment actually took place, is examined. The dependent variable is the 
change in government outlays “∆OUTLAYS”. Note that because only retrenchment 
periods are included in this TSCS subset, all observations on this variable are by definition 
either stable or negative. Hence, this variable only captures the extent of reductions in 
government outlays. This is very useful, since we are solely interested in the determinants 
                                                 
38 For specifics about the estimation of PCSE see Beck and Katz (1995, p. 638).   27  
of retrenchment, whereas fiscal expansion may very well be driven by different political and 
institutional factors that could potential blur the clarity of the results.  
The specification of the logit model is the following: 
P(D1=1) = β0 + β1GDPi,t + β2OUTLAYSi,t + β3DEBTi,t + β4TAXi,t + β5LTERMINTi,t + 
β6UEi,t + β7GOVLEFTi,t  (GOVRIGHTi,t ) + β8PLEFTi,t (PRIGHTi,t) + β9NOPi,t + 
β10POWERi,t 
i=1,…,14;   t=1,…,12 
The subscripts i and t denote the country and the year respectively. The results of this 
model are presented in table 4. As can be seen, this model is estimated employing our first 
definition (D1) of fiscal retrenchment in the second and third column, while showing the 
findings for definition II in the fourth and fifth column. Since the Wooldridge test for 
autocorrelation in panel data (Wooldridge 2002) indicated the existence of first order 
autocorrelation, the above described error correction is being employed. 
Of the economic variables, only the unemployment rate turns out to be significant across 
all specifications, though only at the 0.1 level. The positive sign indicates that a higher 
unemployment rate increases the pressure for attempting retrenchment. Tax revenues and 
the overall debt burden are positively related to the likelihood of budgetary retrenchment. 
This comes as no surprise, since the former could be interpreted as the tax burden on the 
population, which, when rising higher and higher, increases the political pressure for 
reducing it by retrenching the budget. The latter is also quite intuitive, since rising debt 
burdens make retrenchment ever more likely. Yet, both variables are sensitive to the 
definition of consolidation employed and loose their significance in Models 3 and 4.    
Looking at the two veto players variables, we observe that “NOP” is not significant, which 
clearly rejects the weak government hypothesis (H4). Yet, “POWER” emerges with a very 
strong, positive coefficient which is highly significant. This clearly supports H3. The higher 
the power concentration of a political system, that is, the less veto actors there are, the 
bigger the likelihood that fiscal retrenchment will take place. The high significance of this 
variable is not sensitive to the definition of retrenchment employed, only the size of the 
coefficient is smaller in Models 3 and 4.    
Turning our attention to the partisan factors
39, we observe that only the strength of right-
wing parties in government is significant in both specifications  The negative sign for the 
right lends credibility to the Persson/Svensson model. The right will use its increasing 
strength to accumulate debts in order to constrain future left governments’ latitudes. The 
effect is very small however, and only significant at the 0.1 level. The parliamentary 
strength of the Left is only significant in the second specification, with the negative sign 
also supporting the strategic debt model.  
 
                                                 
39 Note that “GOVLEFT” and “PLEFT” include both, left and centrist parties, whereas “GOVRIGHT” and 
“PRIGHT” add  together right wing and centrist parties.   28  











































































GOVLEFT  0.005 
(0.005)    0.001 
(0.004)   
PLEFT  -0.030 
(0.021)    -0.038** 
(0.016)   
GOVRIGHT   -0.009* 
(0.005)    -0.007** 
(0.004) 
PRIGHT   0.002 


















Notes: TSCS logit regression coefficients with white robust standard errors in parentheses; ***Significant at 
the 0.01 level, **Significant at the 0.05 level, *Significant at the 0.1 level 
Source: own calculations. 
In a next step, we further test our hypotheses by pooling all definition I retrenchment 
episodes and test for the factors that led to reductions in government outlays. Therefore, 
we now run an OLS regression on “∆OUTLAYS” using PSCE as explained above. Since 
the Wooldridge test for autocorrelation does not indicate the presence of temporally 
correlated errors
40, the above error correction model is not being employed here.
41 
The OLS model’s full specification is as follows: 
∆OUTLAYS = β0 + β1GDPi,t + β2DEBTi,t + β3TAXi,t + β4LTERMINTi,t + β5UEi,t + 
β6GOVLEFTi,t (GOVRIGHTi,t) + β7NOPi,t + β8POWERi,t + εi,t       
 i=1,…,14;  t=1,…,12 
                                                 
40 This should come as no surprise since T is rather small for every country in this sample. 
41 Including an error correction did not change the results.   29  
The estimation results are explicated in table 5 below. Looking at the economic variables 
first, we observe that “GDP” is significant and negative, which comes as no surprise given 
that “OUTLAYS” is defined in terms of a percentage share of GDP. As in part of the logit 
specification above, the overall debt burden is significant and has a positive sign, long term 
interest rates (LTERMINT) are again not significant. Unemployment has a negative sign 
now but is no longer statistically significant.  
Interestingly, the tax revenue variable is highly significant but now has a negative 
coefficient. This could be interpreted as follows: a high tax burden creates pressure by the 
electorate and economic agents on the government to engage in budgetary retrenchment. 
However, once the government does so, high tax revenues induce it to only moderately 
reduce expenditures (since this reduction of course creates counter pressure by those 
groups negatively affected by these cuts). Hence, the level of tax revenues seem to induce 
governments to engage in retrenching the budget but only moderately so. 



































GOVLEFT  -0.001 
(0.005)   














Notes: TSCS OLS regression coefficients with panel corrected standard errors in parentheses; ***Significant 
at the 0.01 level, **Significant at the 0.05 level, *Significant at the 0.1 level 
Source: own calculations.   30  
Of the partisan variables
42, neither left nor right parties seem to have an impact on the size 
of budgetary consolidation. One has to bear in mind that the dependent variable in this 
specification is the reduction in government outlays. Hence, the extent of any party’s hold 
on government does not seem to influence the size of retrenchment, qualifying therefore 
H1 and H2.  
Regarding the veto variables, we observe the same picture as in the logit analysis. Again, the 
actual number of parties in government is not statistically significant, thus rejecting H4. 
The variable “POWER”, on the other hand, is once more strongly positive and significant, 
suggesting that high power concentration, and therefore fewer veto players, lead to strong 
cuts in public expenditure. This confirms the robustness of this variable’s effects. 
 
5.3   Results 
We are now in a position to summarize the important findings and relate them to our four 
hypotheses. The logit and OLS regressions suggested that higher debt levels induce 
stronger retrenchment. The other economic variables turned out to be either not robust 
across all models (UE) or were not significant at all (LTERMINT). The tax revenue 
variable changed sign in the OLS model as compared to the logit specification. This hints 
to the possibility that some variables may facilitate a policy change, but once that happens, 
constrain the extent of this change.   
Looking at the partisan variables, none of them exerted a statistically significant impact in 
both the logit as well as in the OLS model. Whereas the strength of right-wing parties 
seems to affect the likelihood of consolidations, their extent is not influenced by the 
strength of the Right.  Hence, there is no conclusive evidence on the second hypothesis 
that right wing parties may behave strategically. However, there was no evidence 
supporting the notion that an increasing strength of left-wing parties in government lowers 
likelihood and extent of fiscal consolidation (H1). The variable which captures the number 
of parties in government was far from significant in all tests. It also changed its sign from 
being negative in the logit model to being positive in the OLS specification. Therefore, the 
fourth hypothesis, which holds that retrenchment becomes less likely as the number of 
parties in government increases, can be clearly rejected. However, the other veto players 
variable, “POWER”, proved to be strongly positive and significant in all specifications. As 
this variable increases (that is, as the number of veto players decreases) the likelihood of 
fiscal retrenchment strongly rises. Thus, the third hypothesis, which claims that likelihood 
and extent of retrenchment decreases as the number of institutional veto players grows, is 
plainly confirmed here. 
                                                 
42 The variables capturing the parties’ respective shares in parliament have been omitted since these variables 
were not significant in the definition 1 models of the logit specification. Also, their inclusion would not 
change any of the results.   31  
 
6.   Summary and Conclusions 
This paper endeavoured to illuminate the political and institutional factors that can help 
explain differing degrees of fiscal retrenchment in European Union countries for the time 
period 1990-2001. Applying the partisan perspective it was hypothesized that the success of 
fiscal retrenchment depends on the ideological orientation of the political parties in power. 
A second set of hypotheses was derived from the veto players approach. These predicted 
that successful fiscal consolidation was a function of the number of insitutional veto 
players and the size of the governing coalition. 
In the empirical analyses, it turned out that the overall debt level of a country was one 
important econmic predictor of retrenchment in our EU sample. The impact of other 
economic factos was less clear-cut. Of the political and insitutional variables which 
constituted the focus in this in paper, only the number of insitutional veto players exerted a 
significant influence that was robust across all specifications. Thus, it turned out that 
probability and magnitude of deficit reductions crucially depended on the power 
concentration that a county’s political system exhibits. The more power was concentrated 
in the hands of government, that is, the fewer veto players there were, the more likely was 
that EU country to engage in retrenchment and the more forceful it pursued this policy.  
Note that these statements are by no means normative. It has not been claimed here that 
deficit reduction is per se economically sensible nor do the statements about power 
concentration imply that these systems are “better” in all dimensions. Indeed, strong power 
concentration may come at the cost of fewer checks and balances, and may therefore lead 
to policies that disproportionally burden minorites which have no insitutional channels to 
veto such actions. 
Returning to the beginning of the paper  we can now ask what implications these insights 
may have for the future of fiscal policy coordination in Europe. First of all, from the 
political economy point of view employed here, the recent failure of the SGP comes as no 
surprise. The pact simply imposes numerical targets without paying attention to the 
different institutional constraints that national policymakers face. Yet, given the fact that 
the sanctions of the SGP have to be approved by the ECOFIN council, political log-rolling 
as has happened in the case of Germany and France, is likely to prevent sanctions to be 
ever enacted. Therefore, when making fiscal decisions, policy makers (regardless of which 
ideological coleur) rationally anticipating this will not have to internalize the fiscal, 
reputational and electoral costs that may be associated with a sanction. Therefore, fiscal 
deficits are less costly than would be the case with a well-functioning punishment 
mechanism. Making sanctions mandatory or at least not subject to political bargaining 
within the council could offer a solution to this problem. 
On the other hand, it is also obvious that institutional barriers to fiscal retrenchment 
cannot be overcome by simply setting a defict target. Rather, the SGP should mandate 
every country to enact a national stability pact that is suited to deal with the idiosyncratic   32  
properties of national fiscal policy making. For instance, in Germany the different layers of 
government (federal government, Länder, to a lesser extent municipalities) do all run 
deficits but only  the federal government is repsonsible for keeping the general deficit in 
line with the SGP, even though it cannot reign into the fiscal decisions of the Länder. 
Hence, the Länder do not internalize the same costs when running deficits as the federal 
level does; thus they become a potential veto player since their budgetary preferences will 
differ. A binding national agreement that allocates permissable deficits to the different 
layers of government could solve this problem. This is but one example of how such 
national stability pacts could help making the SGP more effective and deficit reduction 
feasible. How to design such national pacts for those countries that seemed so far 
incapable of retrenchment could be a fruitful task for future research. 
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7.   Annex  
Constitutional Structures of EU Countries 
Number of Chambers 
TYPE OF SYSTEM  DESCRIPTION  COUNTRIES 
Bicameral system  two chambers; 
approval of the second chamber 
is needed for certain issue areas 
Germany 
Weak bicameral system two  chambers; 
second chamber can object 
Austria, Belgium, France, Ireland, Italy, 
Netherlands, Spain, UK 
Unicameral system  only one chamber  Denmark, Finland, Greece, Portugal, 
Sweden 
Regime 
TYPE OF SYSTEM  DESCRIPTION  COUNTRIES 
Pure presidential  directly elected president; 
monistic executive with 
president at the top 
 
Semi-presidential directly elected president; 
dualistic executive with prime 
minister being either dependent 
or independent from president 
Finland, France, Portugal 
Parliamentarian monistic executive with prime 
minister 
Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Germany, 
Greece, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Spain, 
Sweden, UK  
Decentralization 
TYPE OF SYSTEM  DESCRIPTION  COUNTRIES 
Federal system   sub-national regions have 
legislative competences 
Austrian, Belgium, Germany, Italy, Spain 
Unitary system  no legislative competences for 
sub-national regions 
Denmark, Finland, France, Greece, 
Ireland, Netherlands, Portugal, Sweden, 
UK 
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∆Balance  Cyclically adjusted general government balance minus 
Cyclically adjusted general government balance of the 
previous year (in % GDP) 
 
SourceOECD database 
∆Outlays  Total disbursments of government (excluding 
consumption of fixed capital) minus total 
disbursments of government (excluding consumption 
of fixed capital) of the previous year (in % GDP) 
 
SourceOECD database 
GDP  Annual growth the in real Gross Domestic Product (in 
%) 
SourceOECD database 
DEBT  Goss Government Debt (% GDP)  SourceOECD database 
TAX  Total tax revenue (% GDP)  SourceOECD database 
LTERMINT Long  term  interest rates, 10-year benchmark 
goverment bond yields, (in %) 
SourceOECD database 
 
UE OECD  Standardized  unemployment rate  SourceOECD database 
GOVLEFT  Share of social democratic and other left parties in 
cabinet (in %), weighted by days 
Klaus Armingeon, Michelle 
Beyeler, Sarah Menegale. 
Comparative Political Data 
Set 1960-2001, Institute of 
Political Science, University 
of Berne 2002 
GOVRIGHT  Share of right-wing parties in cabinet (in %), weighted 
by days 
Klaus Armingeon et. al., 
Comparative Political Data 
Set 1960-2001 
GOVCENTER  Share of centrist parties in cabinet (in %), weighted by 
days 
 
Klaus Armingeon et. al., 
Comparative Political Data 
Set 1960-2001 
PLEFT  Share of social democratic and other left parties in 
parliament (in %) 
Klaus Armingeon et. al., 
Comparative Political Data 
Set 1960-2001; own 
calculation 
PRIGHT  Share of right-wing parties in parliament (in %) 
 
Klaus Armingeon et. al., 
Comparative Political Data 
Set 1960-2001; own 
calculation 
 
PCENTER  Share of centrist parties in parliament (in %) 
 
Klaus Armingeon et. al., 
Comparative Political Data 
Set 1960-2001; own 
calculation 
 




NOP  Number of parties in government  Thomas Cusack, Lutz 
Engelhardt, The PGL File 
Collection; European Journal 





Balance of the Central Government (in % GDP)  World Development 
Indicators Online 
POWER  Additive index called “Fuchs2p“ consisting of three 
components, that are each coded from 0-3, according 
to increasing power cocentration (and decreasing 
number of veto players): 
1. Chamber System 
Bicameral system  two chambers; 
approval of the second 






second chamber can object 
 
1
Unicameral system  only one chamber  2
 
2. Regime Type 
Pure presidential  directly elected president; 
monistic executive with 
president at the top 
0
Semi-presidential directly elected president; 
dualistic executive with 
prime minister being either 
dependent or independent 
from president 
1


















Unitary system  no legislative competences 
for sub-national regions 
2
 
“Democratic Systems“ data 
set. WZB.   36  
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